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1. Introduction 
As the links between diet and health become more evident, modern consumers value more on 
food nutrition and safety attributes. A series of recent outbreak of food-borne diseases and 
controversial release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have intensified food safety 
concerns both at home and abroad. On the other hand, breakthrough of multilateral trade 
agreements on agriculture has led to lower tariff barriers, higher trade volumes and dramatic 
structural adjustments in both importing and exporting countries. The affected interests 
groups lobby hard for more technical barriers as alternative means of trade protection. The 
pressure from both consumers and interests groups has significant impacts on the related 
regulations and legislations in many countries. There have been global changes in food grades 
and standards, extending from performance criteria to process criteria. The farm to table 
approach, such as hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP), has been required.  
Food quality and safety assurance typically incurs additional transaction costs, arising from 
asymmetric information, moral hazards and monitoring activities (Unnevehr et al. 1999). It 
could have significant implications for the organization and competitiveness of agri-food 
systems (Caswell et al. 1998). This raises a question of how to save transaction costs while 
ensuring food safety at acceptable level. This issue is challenging both agribusinesses and 
governments in the developing countries, where exporting fresh and processed food 
represents an important opportunity to gain from trade liberalisation, and where the marginal 
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costs to improve food quality and safety are higher than the developed countries (Unnevehr 
2000).  
Since the late 1990s, China’s horticultural sector has been developed into one of the largest 
horticultural sectors in the world. Although the growing domestic market has absorbed 
majority of the products, this sector has still become China’s largest exporting agri-food 
industry. Pesticide residue in horticultural products is a typical food safety concern. The 
incidence of Chinese spinach in Japan has triggered significant trade barriers to major agri-
food products from China. This study investigates how food processors react since the 
emergence of food safety concerns by a case study of vegetable industry in Shandong 
Province, the largest horticultural producing and exporting region in China. The study focuses 
on the changing procurement arrangements by food processors. Based on the survey data 
from Laiyang City of Shandong Province, conjoint analysis was conducted to identify the 
relative importance of concerned factors in the context of trade liberalisation and agricultural 
transformation.   
Next section discusses theoretical relationships between transaction costs and vertical 
coordination. The method of conjoint analysis is briefly introduced in section 3, and applied 
to the procurement channel decisions in section 4. Based on the results of conjoint analysis, 
section 5 further discusses the related issues of changing vertical coordination in the Chinese 
agri-food system. The paper ends up with conclusions. 
2.  Transaction Costs and Vertical Coordination     
The literature on vertical coordination suggested that; there exist a variety of determinants of 
vertical coordination. The neoclassical approach focused on market structure, the transaction 
cost approach focused on specific assets, while the competence-based approach focused on 
competences or capabilities. These determinants may individually or in combination influence 
boundaries of the firm. This study adopts the transaction cost approach to understand why  
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transaction costs in the Chinese agri-food system remain at high level and why closer vertical 
coordination can save transaction costs in this system, which is characterized with increasing 
agricultural transformation, institutional transition, and trade liberalization.  
During agricultural transformation, a traditional agriculture evolves into a relatively modern 
and commercialized agriculture; the operations originally integrated within farms are 
disintegrated gradually into the related agribusinesses. At the meantime, interdependence 
between on-farm and off-farm operations becomes increasingly important (Davis and 
Goldberg 1957). The advances in agricultural commercialization and specialization require 
favourable market conditions. Transaction costs are important determinants of this process, in 
addition to the extent of market identified by Stigler. To large extent, the process is 
determined by the trade-off between the economies of specialization and transaction costs. 
The improved infrastructure and the advances in transaction technologies could raise 
transaction efficiencies, leading to lower transaction costs. Industrialization and urbanization 
can stimulate the integration of agriculture with the rest of national economy, which can save 
the transaction costs of agri-food products. All of these favourable conditions will further 
promote agricultural commercialization and specialization to realize the economies of scale 
and specialization in agri-food system. 
Agricultural transformation in China has been seriously hindered by the centrally planned 
economy and the collective farming system. It was the market-oriented reforms that triggered 
the current process of agricultural commercialization and specialization. Two decades after 
the gradualist approach to market economy, China at last joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and started to liberalize its food market to the world. Chinese 
agriculture has been increasingly integrated with the rest of national economy, and further 
integrated with the world food market. The increasing market integration made Chinese 
farmers increasingly depend on market transactions.   
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However, transaction costs in the Chinese agri-food system are very high due to missing 
marketing institutions and infrastructure, emerging specialized farms, and food quality and 
safety requirements. Missing marketing institutions and infrastructure are the common 
phenomena in developing and transition economies. Emerging specialized farms are the 
results of agricultural transformation. And the issues of food quality and safety are highly 
related to trade liberalization. As a result, closer vertical coordination has emerged as one of 
the responses by private business to this dynamic institutional and business environment. The 
causal relationships are described in the analytical framework (see Figure 1).  
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2.1   Missing Market Institutions  
In transition economies, missing market institutions and infrastructure are common. Before 
the transition, the state farms or collective farms need not to concern about procurement of 
farm inputs or marketing farm outputs, because all of transactions were closely controlled by 
the administrative means, not by market mechanism. In that case, transaction costs in agri-
food systems were low (but institutional costs were high). After the market-oriented reforms, 
farms and agribusiness firms became relatively independent entities. Transactions have to rest  
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on market exchanges, no longer on the command. The efficient market operations then 
become critical determinants of the organization of agri-food systems. However, market 
efficiencies are seriously affected by missing market institutions and infrastructure, which 
constituted the major sources of transaction costs in transition economies.  
Missing market institutions and infrastructure may be even worse in China because it adopted 
a gradualist approach to market economy. In the agricultural sector, the price discovery 
mechanism has not well established yet; some commodity markets, such as grain market, are 
still regulated; some factor markets, such as farm credit and rural employment, are almost 
totally missing; farm service markets, such as market information and technological 
extension, are difficult to be established due to their public goods in nature; legal regulation 
and enforcement system is imperfect either. Too many small contracting parties made the 
enforcement costs too high, which in turn, induced even more contract breaching and hold-up 
occurrences. Market risks and uncertainties in the agri-food system are very high. 
According to Williamson (1979), high degree of market risks and uncertainties is necessary 
but not sufficient condition leading to high transaction costs. Another necessary condition is 
transaction-specific investments made by one trading party or by both parties. It is specific 
asset that creates the dependence or even bilateral monopoly between the trading parties. 
Specific assets are in variety of forms, including physical, human, site-specificity. In some 
agri-food industries, site-specificity is significant because the products are highly perishable 
and bulky; their transportation costs are high while shelf life is short. The performance of 
such agri-food industries highly depend on market operational efficiencies, thus, more 
sensitive to missing market institutions and infrastructure.         
2.2   Increasing Specialized Farms 
The market-oriented reforms and trade liberalization have promoted agricultural 
commercialization and specialization. Farmers’ input and output decisions have increasingly  
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based on the principle of profit maximization. Specialization at both regional and farm levels 
have emerged especially in horticultural and livestock industries. However, specialized farms 
may face higher market risks and uncertainties, and then depend on their first handlers or food 
processors, particularly when products are with significant site-specificity, such as vegetables. 
Specialized farms tend to have contractual arrangements with their first handlers or food 
processors. By doing so, they may avoid certain degree of market risks. But this can be 
achieved only at the expense of weaker bargaining power, considering the small scale of 
farms and dependence on their trading parties.         
2.3   Food Quality and Safety Assurance 
As the links between diet and health become more evident, modern consumers value 
increasingly on food quality, particularly nutrition and safety attributes. The food safety 
concerns have been intensified due to the recent outbreak of food borne diseases, and further 
complicated by the controversial release of GMOs. As a result, the issues of identity 
preservation, labelling and traceability have been raised to ensure food quality and safety, and 
niche markets for organic or green food have also emerged as the richer consumers are willing 
to pay premium for higher quality food.  On the other hand, the breakthrough of multilateral 
trade agreements on agriculture has led to lower trade barriers, higher trade volume and 
painful structural adjustments in both developed and developing countries. The interests 
groups lobby for more technical barriers as means of protection of trade. The pressure from 
both consumers and interests groups has significant impacts on the regulations and 
legislations. And the regulations of grades and standards on food quality and safety have been 
used as so-called “green barriers”.  
In order to get access to foreign markets, food quality and safety assurance becomes a 
necessary condition. However, food quality and safety assurance typically incurs additional 
transaction costs arising from asymmetric information, moral hazards and monitoring  
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(Unnevehr et al. 1999). Usually, food safety attributes are credence in nature; consumers have 
significant difficulties or cannot assess the attributes even after their consumption of the food. 
Such measurement difficulties and asymmetric information between sellers and buyers may 
lead to the failure of the market for food safety (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996), For ensuring 
food quality and safety, government interventions and quality signalling mechanisms are 
introduced, such as grades and standards regulations, informational labelling, third-party 
certification, and vertical integration. These public and private actions have important 
implications for the organization, productivity and competitiveness of agri-food industries. 
Food quality and safety assurance could be more expensive in China because of the extremely 
small operational scale of the family farms, which averaged only half hectare of arable land 
per household. The quality and safety attributes of final products are determined over the food 
supply chains, including the first link of the chains: farm production. The extreme small scale 
of family farms leads to too costly testing fees or monitoring costs. Food processors have to 
pay much more on the controlling or monitoring farm production than ever before. 
2.4   Vertical Coordination in China      
As Menard (2000) stated that, inefficient governance structures will be eliminated if the 
economic agents obtain the freedom to choose from alternative coordination mechanisms. The 
institutional transition has provided such opportunities for the Chinese farmers. The 
institutional and organizational innovations have emerged firstly in the horticultural sector 
since the mid-1990s in Shandong province, the largest horticultural producing and exporting 
province in China. The model has been called Nongye chanye hua (means 
agroindustrialization in Chinese), which mainly refers to encouraging regional specialization 
and establishing channel captains to exploit external economies of scale in the condition of 
the small family farm system. Closer vertical coordination between farmers and channel 
captains are the core component of this model (Zhang 1997). There are currently more than  
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4000 channel captain food processors, coordinating 40 percent of farm households and 50 
percent of arable land in this province (Wu 2002).  
A task force has been set up under the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) by the end of 1996 to 
supervise agroindustrialization. Promotion of agroindustrialization has been suggested as a 
national strategy for rural development by the 15
th Central Committee Meeting of Chinese 
Communist Party. Since then, there have been increasing vertical coordination. According to 
the survey by MOA, there were 39 million rural households (15 percent of national total rural 
households) got involved in agroindustrialization in 1998 (Wan 2000). The coordination 
mechanisms include contractual arrangements (accounting for 80 percent), cooperative 
shareholdings (11 percent) and cooperatives (9 percent). Until 2000, 59 millions rural 
households have joined in agroindustrialization, accounting for 25 percent of the national total 
rural households (Du 2001). 
3.  Method of Conjoint Analysis  
As more processed and semi-processed horticultural products are demanded by both domestic 
and foreign markets, food processors become increasingly important players in horticultural 
supply chains. They usually behave as channel captains along food supply chains. They can 
buy fresh vegetables from alternative supply channels and sell their processed products 
through alternative marketing channels. They can purchase fresh vegetables from middlemen, 
from wholesale markets, or directly from farmers. Their choice among the alternative supply 
channels mainly depends on the following considerations. Firstly, whether the channel can 
keep stable supply of vegetables, which is essential for the capacity utilization and the scale 
economies of the processors. Secondly, whether the channel is characterized with low 
transaction costs, which is particularly important for horticultural products due to the high 
proportion of transaction costs in the retailing prices. Thirdly, whether the channel is able to  
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guarantee food quality and safety, which is critical in the context of globalisation and fierce 
international competition.  
Just as goods and services can be viewed as bundles of attributes (Lancaster 1966), vegetable 
procurement channels also display different attributes or characteristics. From the perspective 
of transaction costs, some attributes are transaction costs generating while other attributes are 
transaction costs saving. Food processors have to trade-off the attribute levels to minimize 
transaction costs and to maximize the total utility obtained from the channels. From this 
perspective, conjoint analysis can be used to identify the relative importance of these 
attributes.  
Conjoint analysis is a multivariate technique for finding out how buyers make trade-offs 
among competing products or suppliers (Green et al. 2001). Using conjoint analysis, 
researchers can answer such questions as what product attributes are important and what 
levels of the product attributes are the most desirable. Researchers can further predict how the 
buyers will choose from the alternative products and suppliers with the help of choice 
simulator. This kind of simulation is particularly useful to understand the buyers’ reactions to 
and evaluations of pre-determined attribute combinations that may represent potential 
products and services (Hair et al. 1995).  
Conjoint analysis has evolved from the seminal work by psychometric researchers (Luce and 
Tukey 1964). The approach then has been successfully applied in marketing research since 
1970s (Green and Srinivasan 1978, 1990; Carroll and Green 1995; Green et al. 2001). 
Facilitated by the widespread introduction of computers and by the availability of conjoint 
softwares, this approach has been widely used for commercial purposes in the United States 
and Europe (Cattin and Wittink 1982; Wittink and Catin 1989; Wittink et al. 1994). Over the 
last three decades, thousands of applications have been carried out, the majority of which 
focused on new product evaluation, competitive analysis, and market segmentation. There  
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were also some applications in marketing channel choices and supply chain designs (Hobbs 
1996).     
Conjoint analysis is a decompositional approach to finding out how consumers make trade-
offs among competing products with multi-attributed characteristics. The basic assumption of 
this approach is that consumers evaluate the total utility (total worths) of a product by 
combining the separate part utility (part-worths) for attribute levels of that product. 
Researchers at first develop a set of alternative products (real or hypothetical) in terms of 
bundles of attributes through fractional factorial designs. These real or hypothetical products 
are then presented to the consumers during the survey. And the consumers are asked to rank, 
order or rate these alternatives. Because the products are represented in terms of bundles of 
attributes at mixed “good” and “bad” levels, the consumers have to evaluate the total utility 
from all of the attribute levels simultaneously to make their judgements. Based on these 
judgements, the researchers can estimate the part-worths for the attribute levels by assuming 
certain composition rules. Then the part-worths are used to calculate the relative importance 
of each attribute and formulate the consumer-choice simulator for prediction purpose (Green 
and Srinivasan 1990; Hair et al. 1995; Green et al. 2001). Conjoint analysis is usually 
composed of the following steps: 
3.1   Selection of Attributes and Levels 
Both economists and psychologists suggest that products can be defined as bundles of 
attributes (Lancaster 1966; Fishbein 1967). While consumers may have heterogenous 
preferences over these attributes, the same decision issue facing all of consumers is how to 
trade off the possibility that product X is better than product Y on attribute A, while product 
Y is better than product X on attribute B (Green et al. 2001). A consumer’s decision to choose 
product X over product Y is determined by his/her underlying preference structure. The 
purpose of conjoint analysis is to reveal the consumer’s preference structure, and then use this  
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empirical information to simulate how consumers will react to the bundles of attributes, which 
may represent potential new products. 
Any product may be represented by lots of attributes; depending from which perspective, you 
view. Therefore, the selection of attributes and levels for a product is basically determined by 
the specific purpose of the research. The researchers must first be sure to define the total 
worth of the product. And all of the selected attributes and levels should have significant 
impacts on the consumer choice decision. The selection of attributes and levels must satisfy 
several general requirements, such as, actionable and communicable attributes, balanced and 
reasonable ranges of attribute levels, avoidance of inter-attribute correlation (Hair et al. 1995).  
3.2   Fractional Factorial Design 
The products are described in terms of combinations of attributes at mixed levels in conjoint 
analysis. These combinations are also called profiles or experimental stimuli. The consumers 
are asked to rank, order or rate these alternative profiles during the survey. However, the 
number of possible combinations of the attributes is usually too large for the consumers to 
make meaningful judgement. Therefore, the researchers need to reduce the number of profiles 
presented to the consumers while still maintaining orthogonal among the part-worth 
estimates. Fractional factorial design is used for this purpose, which produces only subsets of 
complete possible combinations of the attributes. Such kind of subsets is called orthogonal 
arrays, in which only main effects are considered while interactions are assumed negligible. 
3.3   Data Collection by the Survey 
In conjoint analysis, the independent variables and their values are predetermined by the 
researchers during the conjoint experimental designs. These independent variables are non-
metric or categorical variables. The dependent variable is the consumer choice decision or the 
consumer overall evaluation on the alternative profiles. The researchers present the profiles to  
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the consumers during the survey to ask the consumers to rank, order, or rate these alternative 
profiles. The results of the ranking, ordering or rating by the consumers constitute the 
observation data for the dependent variable—the only data needed to collect for conjoint 
analysis. The survey for conjoint analysis could be conducted by personal interviews, by 
mails, or by phone. 
3.4   Estimation of Conjoint Model 
During the survey, the consumers are asked to provide only their overall evaluations on the 
alternative profiles by ranking, ordering, or rating. Unlike the expectancy-value model (a 
compositional approach in nature), conjoint analysis is a decompositional approach. The 
consumers do not need to tell the researchers anything else, such as, how important is the 
specific attribute level to the consumer, because the researchers have constructed the real or 
hypothetical products in a specific manner, so that the part-worths for attribute levels and the 
relative importance of each attribute can be inferred from the consumers’ overall evaluations 
in terms of ranking, ordering or rating.  
In order to estimate the conjoint model, researchers have to assume the composition rule and 
have to specify the types of the part-worth relationships. The most often used compositional 
rule is additive rule, which assumes the consumer just “add up” the part-worths for attribute 
levels to calculate the total worths of a product. There are four types of the part-worth 
relationships between the consumer preference and the attribute levels: linear, quadratic, part-
worth, and mixed model. The linear relation indicates that the consumer preference increases 
or decreases with increasing value of the attribute. The quadratic relation assumes that the 
preference is maximal at the ideal and then decreases when moving away from it. The part-
worth relation assumes each level of the attribute has a unique part-utility relationship 
associated with it. The mixed model just combines all of the above three types of relationships 
(Green and Srinivasan 1978).   
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3.5   Consumer Choice Simulation 
The results of conjoint estimation are traditionally applied in three major fields: market 
segmentation, competitive analysis, and choice simulation. The part-worths estimates can be 
used to formulate the consumer-choice simulator to predict how consumers might react to the 
bundles of attributes, which represent potential new products. The choice simulation follows 
three-step process: (1) estimate and validate conjoint model for each consumer; (2) select the 
sets of stimuli to test according to possible competitive scenarios; (3) simulate the choices of 
all consumers for the specified sets of stimuli and predict market share for each stimulus by 
aggregating their choices (Hair et al 1995). There are four alternative rules to be selected for 
simulation purpose: (1) maximum utility; (2) Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL); (3) logit, and (4) 
alpha. 
4.  Application of Conjoint Analysis 
The choice decision reflects food processors’ preference structure and their trade-offs among 
the attributes. In the context of speeding farm specialization and trade liberalization, saving 
transaction costs and guaranteeing food quality and safety are essential for maintaining or 
gaining the competitive advantage, which significantly influence food processors’ choice of 
supply channels. This study has selected four attributes with vegetable supply channels, that 
is, testing fees for pesticide residues in vegetables; traceability from processors to vegetable 
growers; trust between food processors and vegetable growers; and how difficult for food 
processors to monitor vegetable growers. The survey for this conjoint analysis was conducted 
in Laiyang city, Shandong province. 
The two basic assumptions for conjoint analysis are: (1) a product can be perceived as a 
bundle of attributes; (2) a consumer evaluates the total utility of a product simply by 
combining the separate part utility for the attributes of the product. Hobbs (1996) argued that 
a supply channel could be also viewed as a bundle of attributes, just similar to a product. A  
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food processor evaluates the total utility of a supply channel by combining the separate part 
utility for the attributes of the channel. The food processor’s choice among the alternative 
supply channels depends on his overall evaluation of the alternative channels, and 
fundamentally determined by his preference structure. Conjoint analysis can empirically 
reveal his preference structure.  
To conduct this conjoint analysis, the total utility function for the food processor should be 
defined firstly. In this study, we assume that transaction costs and quality assurance are the 
major determinants of the total utility with supply channels. This assumption can be justified 
by the fact that transaction costs account for the majority of retailing price of horticultural 
products, any significant reduction of transaction costs in horticultural marketing and 
distribution means the improved firm profitability. On the other hand, quality assurance is 
becoming the priority of food processors in the context of increasing concerns about food 
quality and safety from both domestic and foreign consumers. The quality assurance and the 
corresponding organizational innovations may trigger the relative changes in transaction costs 
with the alternative supply channels. The stricter quality control could mean higher 
transaction costs spent on the supply chains. Both transaction costs and quality assurance are 
the significant determinants of the competitiveness of a food processor. Trade-offs must be 
made by food processors during their decisions on supply channel choices. Which attributes 
are more emphasized by food processors in the context of speeding agricultural 
commercialization and trade liberalization? Conjoint analysis could help to answer such kind 
of questions.   
4.1   Selection of Attributes and Levels 
Once the total utility function for food processors has been defined, all of those factors, which 
significantly influence transaction, costs and quality assurance should be included in the 
bundle of attributes. Among these attribute levels, some are transaction costs generating,  
 15 
some are transaction costs saving, the former creates the negative utility, the latter brings 
positive utility for the food processor. Food processors choose among the alternative channels 
in order to maximize their total utility with the supply channels, that is, to minimize the 
transaction costs while assuring the quality and safety of their food products. 
Many factors affect transaction costs and quality assurance with supply channels. Transaction 
cost economics has identified information costs, negotiation costs, and monitoring costs as the 
major sources of transaction costs. The organization of a supply channel has significant 
impacts on the types and levels of transaction costs with the channels. It also influences the 
capability for a food processor to control the quality and safety of his final food products 
through these channels. Considering the restrictions on the numbers and other general 
requirements on the attributes and levels, we have selected 4 attributes with 2 balanced levels 
characterized with a supply channel, that is, test fees for pesticide residue in vegetables per 
unit of product; traceability from the processor to the vegetable growers; trust between food 
processors and vegetable growers; difficulty for the food processor to monitor their customer 
farmers. All of these attributes are transaction costs related.  
The first attribute is test fees for pesticide residue in vegetables. From the food processors’ 
perspective, test fees are quite different and can be distinguished among the alternative supply 
channels. For the supply channel via middlemen, the test fees at each unit of vegetables are 
very high because of small batch of transactions with small households. In contrast, if the 
processor procures from wholesale markets or from large farms, the test fees at each unit of 
products are much lower thanks to the large transaction quantity each time.     
The second attribute is traceability from the processor to the vegetable growers. In the context 
of emerging concerns about food quality and safety, food processors do care about how fresh 
vegetables are procured, because it affects the quality of their final products. In order to 
encourage high quality suppliers and avoid low quality suppliers, food processors must get to  
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know who is the original producer for this batch of vegetables. If food processors can easily 
trace back to the original producers, they can screen out the quality suppliers at low 
information costs. Apparently, it is very difficult to trace back with spot market, and quite 
easy to trace back with direct marketing. 
The third attribute is trust between food processors and the vegetable growers, which is a 
particularly important factor in the context of transition economies, where missing market 
institutions are popular and hold-up between food processors and farmers prevails. When the 
market price is higher than the contract price, farmers may breach their contracts and sell their 
vegetables to the market, not to the contractors. In contrast, if the market price is lower than 
the contract price, food processors may also breach their contracts and procure the vegetables 
from the market at cheaper price. Lack of trust could be a disaster not only for food 
processors, but also for farmers. Trust between food processors and farmers could greatly 
save transaction costs, and reduce the uncertainty of their exchanges. Therefore, the supply 
channel, which characterized with high trust, is, of course, desirable.  
The last attribute is the level of difficulty for food processors to monitor their client farmers. 
In contract farming, food processors have some management powers. This is different from 
the classical market contract, which defines only buying and selling relations. As vertical 
coordination becomes more advanced, farmers delegate more powers to food processors, and 
consequently, food processors will supervise or monitor the activities of farm production in 
terms of technical promotion or even direct control of farm operational decisions. This kind of 
contract is becoming popular as food quality and safety issues emerge. As for vegetables, 
pesticide residue and planting schedule are typically concerned by food processors, because 
food processors need balanced vegetable supply to keep their capacity usage at high level, 
which requires farmers to plant their vegetables scheduled by food processors.  
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According to Hair et al. (1995), balanced levels are preferred in conjoint analysis, especially 
for the estimation of the relative importance of the attributes. Hence, two balanced levels are 
assigned to each attribute in this study: “high” and “low” for the test fees; “difficult” and 
“easy” for the traceability; “bad” and “good” for the trust; and “difficult” and “easy” for the 
monitor.       
4.2   Fractional Factorial Design 
The complete factorial combinations for four attributes with two levels are 16 (2
4 =16). It is 
difficult for the food processor to rank, order or rate all of these combinations meaningfully 
during the survey. For this reason, fractional factorial design is used to generate orthogonal 
arrays—subsets of all possible combinations of the attribute levels, which consider only main 
effects of the factors. The selected orthogonal array in this study has been produced with 
SPSS software (see Table 1). The chosen orthogonal array contains 10 combinations 
(profiles), the first eight of them are for conjoint estimation, and last two combinations are 
holdout for model validation purpose.  
These combinations are not the exact proxies of the real supply channels, but the attributes are 
abstracted from the real supply channels. Take the first combination as an example: low test 
fees for pesticide residue in vegetables per unit of product may indicate that the quantity of 
each transaction is large. The possible trading parties with food processors in this case may be 
large scale farmers or wholesalers; difficult traceability to the original producers may be 
represented by spot market, such as the channel via wholesalers, who can transform small 
transactions into large transactions, but they are difficult to trace back the original producers; 
Good trust existing between food processors and sellers implies that the specific investments 
for the transactions are significant. This could be the highly specialized vegetable grower. 
High specialization in perishable vegetable production has made them more vulnerable and  
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dependent on food processors. Thus, they value the relationships with food processors. And 
they are more easily monitored by processors.   
         Table 1  Orthogonal Design for Conjoint Analysis 
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  1  Low  Difficult  Good  Easy 
  2  High  Easy  Bad  Easy 
  3  High  Difficult  Good  Difficult 
  4  Low  Easy  Good  Difficult 
  5  Low  Easy  Bad  Difficult 
  6  Low  Difficult  Bad  Easy 
  7  High  Difficult  Bad  Difficult 
  8  High  Easy  Good  Easy 
  9  (H)  High  Easy  Good  Difficult 
  10(H)  High  Difficult  Good  Easy 
 
4.3   Data Collection by the Survey 
To collect data for the conjoint analysis, the survey has been conducted in Laiyang city, 
Shandong province. The survey covered almost all of formal food processors in this City. 
Although the sample size is small, the sample is quite typical for the region where 
increasingly specializes in producing and exporting horticultural products. The farm 
specialization and trade liberalization have significantly influenced the organization of agri-
food systems in such kind of regions. The survey questionnaire for food processor is based on 
the above orthogonal design (see Appendix A). Food processors are asked to rank the 10 
combinations. The most preferred combination ranks 1, while the least preferred combination 
ranks 10. There are some notes for the questionnaire: (a) test fees are the fees spent on testing  
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pesticide residue in vegetables per unit of product; (b) traceability refers to the ability for food 
processors to trace back original producers; (c)  trust is mutual creditability between food 
processors and vegetable growers; (d)  monitor refers to the ability for food processors to 
monitor farmers’ activities.     
4.4   Estimation of Conjoint Model 
In order to estimate the conjoint model, firstly we have to assume the composition rule and 
the types of relationships between preferences and the attribute levels. In this study, the 
additive rule and the linear relationships between the preferences and the attribute levels have 
been assumed. SPSS software has been used to estimate the part-worths for the attribute 
levels and the relative importance of the attributes. The results of conjoint analysis are 
reported in Figure 2 and Table 2.  
          Figure 2   Relative Importance of Four Attributes with Vegetable Supply Channels 
              Sample Averaged vs Longda Group
       Channel Attributes






































The part-worths for the eight attribute levels have been estimated for the 52 food processors 
respectively. But Table 2 only reports the estimates for the sample average and a typical large 
food processor—Longda Group. The estimates are normalized, and they can be compared 
each other. For all of the negative attribute levels, the part-worths are assigned as zero. For 
the positive attribute levels, the larger the coefficients, and the more important this attribute is 
for channel choice decision. It can be seen that the trust is the largest coefficient, which 
implies that the trust is the most emphasized factor for the sample average. In contrast, large 
food processors are more emphasize the traceability factor. The part-worth estimates for the 
traceability and the trust are just the same for Longda Group.   
       Table 2   Results of Conjoint Analysis: Sample Averaged and Longda Group 
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Based on the part-worth estimates, conjoint procedure can further deduce the relative 
importance of each attribute in the choice decision. The results of conjoint analysis 
demonstrate that trust and traceability are the dominant factors among the four attributes 
concerned in this study. For the sample average, the most important attribute is the trust 
between food processors and the vegetable growers, which accounts for 31.86 percent among 
the total importance. The second important attribute is the traceability from food processors to 
the vegetable growers, accounting for 27.47 percent. The third attribute is the ability for food 
processors to supervise and monitor farmer’s activities (22.74 percent). And the last attribute 
is the fees spent on testing pesticide residue in vegetables (17.93 percent). In comparison with 
the sample average, large food processors emphasize more on the traceability and the test 
fees, because they are usually export-oriented food processors, and more concern about the 
emerging food quality and safety issues. For example, Longda Group values traceability 2 
percentages higher, and values the test fees 6 percentages higher than the sample average. 
Pearson’s R and Kendall’s tau have been reported in Table 2 for the sample average and 
Longda Group respectively. These correlation coefficients demonstrate that the fitness of the 
model is excellent. Furthermore, two holdout combinations are specifically designed for 
model validation purpose. The high values of Kendall’s tau for holdouts confirm the validity 
of the model.  
4.5   Channel Choice Simulation 
The estimated part-worths for the attributes can be further used to formulate the channel 
choice simulator to predict how food processors will choose among the potential alternative 
supply channels, which may have some useful policy implications. In this study, we assume 
three possible alternative vegetable supply channels for simulation purpose. The first supply 
channel is with all negative attribute levels: high test fees per unit of product; difficult to trace 
back the quality and safety; no trust between the trading parties; and difficult for food  
 22 
processors to monitor the farm activities. This kind of supply channel can represent spot 
market, particularly small diversified farmers via middlemen. The second channel is with all 
positive attributes except for high test fees for pesticide residue, which could represent large 
farmers via few agents. And the third channel is with all positive attributes, which may be 
represented by direct marketing channel from large organic farms to processors. 
     Table 3  Results of Conjoint Simulations 
  Channel 1  Channel 2  Channel 3 
  Channel Characteristics 
   Test Fees 
   Traceability 
   Trust 
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The simulations tell us if food processors have opportunities to choose from these three 
alternative supply channels, what decision they possibly make. The choice simulator is based 
on the above conjoint analysis. Three choice rules are adopted for the simulations: maximum 
utility, BTL and Logit. The simulation results in Table 3 show that among three alternative 
channels, almost no food processor likes to choose the first channel (spot market). For the 
second channel, the results are somewhat inconvergent, arranging from 13.46 to 44.66 percent 
of food processors may choose this channel, depending what choice rule adopted. For the 
third channel, 50 to 86.5 percent of food processors possibly choose this channel.  
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5. Further  Discussions 
In this conjoint analysis, the four attributes concerned are all related to the transaction costs 
with vegetable supply channels. The alternative combinations of the attribute levels may 
represent the different levels of transaction costs. If the preferences given by food processors 
are consistent with the levels of the transaction costs with these combinations, our hypothesis 
in this study—the food processor choose among the alternative supply channels to minimize 
the transaction costs—can be confirmed. The conjoint simulations can provide us with 
preference scores for the alternative combinations, which is an excellent proxy of the 
preferences by food processors. The difficult issue is the measurement of transaction costs 
with the alternative combinations. However, we only need to rank the levels of transaction 
costs with these combinations. Thus, the indirect approach would be enough for this purpose.  
Conjoint simulations demonstrate that the preference scores given by sample average for 
channel 1, channel 2, and channel 3, are 0.9, 7.3 and 8.1 respectively. Preference scores given 
by Longda Group for these three channels are 0.3, 6.7 and 8.7 respectively. Among these 
three alternative channels, preferences by food processors are quite clear: channel 3 is most 
preferred, channel 1 is least preferred, and channel 2 is suboptimal channel with relatively 
high preference scores.  
What about the relative levels of transaction costs with these three alternative supply 
channels? The test fees for pesticide residue in vegetables are the sources of information 
costs. The ability for the food processor to trace back and monitor the vegetable growers 
affect the monitoring costs. Lack of trust and potential hold-up are the direct sources of 
transaction costs. The transaction costs are necessarily high for the supply channel with such 
characteristics as high test fees, difficult traceability, lack of trust, and difficult to monitor the 
contract producers. On contrary, if the supply channel is characterized with low test fees, easy 
traceability, trust, and easy monitoring, such as channel 3, the transaction costs must be low.  
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Among the three alternative channels, channel 2 is the same as channel 3 except the high test 
fees. We can conclude that the relative level of transaction costs with these three channels: 
channel 3 < channel 2 < channel 1. This ordering is just the same as that of the preference 
scores given by food processors in the conjoint simulations.  
The conjoint simulations predict the probabilities for food processors to choose from 
alternative channels. The probability for food processors to choose channel 1 is nearly zero. In 
contrast, the probability for food processors to choose channel 3 is very high, 86.5 percent if 
the utility maximum rule is used, 68.1 percent, if the Logit rule is used, and 50 percent if BTL 
rule is used. Apparently, food processors will choose channel 3 against channel 1. However, 
the choice between channel 3 and channel 2 is not so clear if BTL rule is used: the 
probabilities to choose channel 3 is 50 percent, while the probabilities to choose channel 2 is 
44.7 percent. If the utility maximum rule or the Logit rule is used, food processors 
significantly prefer channel 3 against channel 2. 
From the results of conjoint simulations and the above analysis, we can conclude that our 
hypothesis is confirmed in this study. Food processors prefer the supply channel with low 
transaction costs. Even if the food quality and safety issues have been emerging recently, food 
processors are still seeking to save transaction costs while maintaining the assurance of food 
quality and safety. 
Food processors prefer channel 3 because of the low transaction costs associated with it. The 
existing direct marketing channel from large organic farms to food processors is similar to 
channel three. However, does this kind of channel dominate in future China? This question 
cannot be answered simply by conjoint analysis; it should be discussed in the context of the 
business and institutional environments in China. If this kind of supply channel is only used 
for organic foods, then, the popularity of this kind of channel will be restricted by the market 
demand both at home and overseas. If extended to general foods, then, large farm size is not  
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realistic in near future, because the small households dominate in the Chinese agri-food 
system. For practical consideration, farm size is necessarily small in China even if the existing 
land tenure system reformed to allow certain land concentration. The small farm size makes it 
difficult for food processors to trace back and to monitor the contract farmers, which lead to 
the high monitoring costs. And the test fees per unit of product are also high. That is why 
currently the large exported-oriented food processors are not willing to deal with small 
farmers. During the survey, we found that some food processors proposed that their customer 
farmers must be large enough (at least 2 hectares of land for vegetable production). Clearly, it 
is difficult to increase farm size significantly in near future.  
Farm size is only one of the important determinants; farm specialization and trust between 
food processors and vegetable growers are more important factors in channel choice for both 
farmers and processors. The potential hold-up is the major source of transaction costs. The 
conjoint simulations show that food processors value the trust as the most important attribute 
with a supply channel. If food processors could trace back and monitor easily their contract 
farmers, the monitoring costs are low. If there exists the trust between food processors and the 
vegetable growers, the transaction costs are low. The preference scores are still quite high for 
the supply channel with high test fees, but with easy traceability and monitoring, as well as 
with trust, such as channel 2. The conjoint simulations show that the preference scores for 
channel 2 is 7.3 given by the sample average, and 6.7 given by Longda Group. There is 44.7 
percent possibility for food processors to choose channel 2 if based on the BTL rule.         
6. Implications  and  Conclusions 
The recently emerged food quality and safety issues are the important sources of transaction 
costs in the Chinese agri-food system. Food processors imposed the food quality inspection, 
which induced farmers to shift their marketing channel to avoid the refusal of their products. 
At the same time, food processors also incurred much more transaction costs in inspecting,  
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monitoring and tracing back the contracting farmers. This kind of transaction costs mainly 
arises from the principal-agent issues—asymmetric information, asymmetric incentives and 
measurement difficulties. Saving transaction costs while still maintaining food quality and 
safety becomes a challenging task, particularly in the condition of the small family farm 
system. Both private and public actions are needed. 
6.1   Private Actions 
There is a variety of strategies to deal with the food quality and safety issues, such as, closer 
vertical coordination, third-party verification, and branding and reputation strategy (Sporleder 
and Goldsmith 2001). Vertical integration has been approved effective in reducing pesticide 
residues in horticultural products (Kilmer et al. 2001). But it is not possible to adopt this 
strategy to control the whole process of food production from farm to table, because the 
management costs with this strategy is usually too high, and then very few successful cases 
existed in the history. An alternative mechanism is strategic alliances or cooperative 
arrangements along food supply chains, usually called food supply chain management. 
Supply chain management emphasizes information flows and cooperation between upstream 
and downstream firms, but it is still mainly based on market transactions. Hence, this strategy 
can effectively save transaction costs as well as bureaucratic costs along food supply chains. 
When agribusiness firms adopt the differentiation strategy through branding and reputation to 
signal the product quality to the consumers, they usually have to implement food supply chain 
management to enhance the credibility of their branded names. 
6.2   Public Actions  
Only very few multinationals have the capabilities to develop their own private grades and 
standards. Agribusiness firms usually have to adopt the public grades and standards. In China, 
farmers and food processors are very small, the differentiation strategy through branding and 
reputation is usually not feasible for them. Therefore, third party verification and public  
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regulations on grades and standards become very important for these small agribusiness firms 
to deal with food quality and safety economically. To implement public grades and standards 
system, government certification and testing centres are necessary institutions and 
infrastructure.  
In addition, informational labelling can also reduce measurement costs and lower transaction 
costs with the contracting parties. According to (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996), food safety 
and nutrition are largely credence attributes where the consumer has significant difficulty or 
cannot assess quality even after consumption. As a result, the informed consumer and 
reputation models do not apply to food safety and nutrition. Quality signalling may be still 
used, but a reputable certification agent is required. The government is such an agent who can 
make it practicable for consumers to assess food quality by requiring informational labelling. 
The mandatory label that discloses the information about the nature of product and process of 
production can transform credence attributes into search attributes where consumers can 
determine the quality of this product before they buy it by examining or researching the 
product. Pesticide residue in vegetables is a credence attribute. Unless mandatory 
informational label is provided, vegetable consumers cannot make judgement about the 
quality of vegetables. 
6.3   Conclusions          
This study explored how food processors choose their vegetable supply channels in the 
context of emerging food quality and safety issues based on the conjoint analysis. The 
hypothesis is that food processors choose among the alternative channels so as to minimize 
the transaction costs associated with the channels. The conjoint simulations provided us with 
preference scores for the concerned channels, which are the excellent proxies of preferences. 
The indirect approach was used to order the relative level of the transaction costs with 
alternative channels. The study confirmed that food processors shift their supply channels to  
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save transaction costs while maintaining food quality and safety. The most important attribute 
with supply channel is the trust between the trading parties. The second important attribute is 
traceability, which is particularly important for exported-oriented food processors. Although 
farm size is an influential factor for testing fees and traceability, farm specialization and trust 
are more critical. 
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